Pricing and yield mechanics
Base rate, spread, floor, discount and fees - and the exact arithmetic that turns them into a yield.
A quoted private credit loan is a base rate plus a spread, issued at a discount, with a fee schedule attached and call protection over the early years. None of those components is the yield. The yield is the internal rate of return on the actual cash flows over the actual holding period, and because private credit loans are repaid on refinancing rather than at maturity, the holding period assumption moves the answer by more than most of the pricing terms do.
Components of the all-in cost and where each one lands
Borrower cost and lender yield are not the same number. Fees paid to an arranger that the lender does not retain raise the borrower's cost and not the lender's yield; OID does both.
| Component | Formula | Raises borrower cost | Raises lender yield |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base rate | B, the reference rate for the interest period | Yes | Yes, and it is passed through, so it is not credit compensation |
| Base rate floor | max(F - B, 0) | Yes, only while B < F | Yes, only while B < F |
| Credit spread adjustment (CSA) | A fixed additive adjustment to B, in bps | Yes | Yes; it exists to make a SOFR-based rate economically comparable to a LIBOR-based one |
| Credit spread | S, in bps over the base rate | Yes | Yes; this is the credit compensation |
| OID / issue discount | Points below par at funding; price = 100 - OID | Yes, it reduces net proceeds | Yes, it is accreted to par over the life |
| Upfront / arrangement fee | Points on the commitment, paid at close | Yes | Only to the extent the lender retains it rather than paying it away |
| Unused commitment fee | rate * undrawn commitment * days/360 | Yes, on the undrawn portion | Yes; it is the price of the option to draw |
| Ticking fee | rate * commitment * days/360 from a start date to funding | Yes | Yes; it compensates for capital held against an unfunded commitment |
| Amendment / consent fee | Points on the amending class's holdings | Yes | Yes, and it is realised at the moment credit quality is being renegotiated |
| Prepayment premium / call protection | Points above par on early repayment | Yes, on early exit only | Yes, and it shortens the effective holding period over which OID accretes |
SOFR and the credit spread adjustment
SOFR is an overnight secured rate; LIBOR was a term unsecured rate. The static spread adjustments below are the ARRC and ISDA recommended values, codified for LIBOR-referencing contracts without workable fallbacks by the Federal Reserve's Regulation ZZ under the LIBOR Act. They are a published legal artefact, not a market observation, and they do not update.
| USD LIBOR tenor | Static spread adjustment (percent) | In basis points |
|---|---|---|
| Overnight | 0.00644 | 0.644 |
| 1-month | 0.11448 | 11.448 |
| 3-month | 0.26161 | 26.161 |
| 6-month | 0.42826 | 42.826 |
| 12-month | 0.71513 | 71.513 |
SOFR conventions in loan documents
Three distinct rates are all called SOFR. Which one a document uses changes when the rate is known, how it is compounded, and what operational machinery the borrower needs.
| Convention | How it is computed | Known in advance | Where it is used |
|---|---|---|---|
| Term SOFR | A forward-looking term rate published for set tenors, derived from SOFR derivatives | Yes, set at the start of the interest period | The dominant convention in syndicated and private credit loan documents, because it behaves like LIBOR operationally |
| Daily Simple SOFR | Arithmetic average of daily SOFR over the interest period, no compounding | No, known only at period end | Some bilateral and ABL facilities; simplest to administer of the backward-looking options |
| SOFR Compounded in Arrears | Daily SOFR compounded over the period, usually with a lookback and observation shift | No | Derivatives and some larger facilities; the ARRC-preferred convention for hedgeable exposure |
| Daily Simple SOFR with a lookback | As above, shifted back a set number of business days so the rate is known before payment | Rate known shortly before payment, not at period start | Facilities that want arrears economics with a workable payment mechanic |
Worked yield table - one loan, three exit assumptions
Par 100, issued at 98 (2 points of OID), base rate 4.00 percent with a 1.00 percent floor, spread 500 bps, so the cash coupon r = max(4.00, 1.00) + 5.00 = 9.00 percent. Bullet maturity in 6 years. Call protection 102 in year 1, 101 in year 2, par thereafter. Annual periods, ACT/ACT for legibility. Inputs are illustrative and are not market levels.
| Exit assumption | Cash flows | Yield (IRR) | Difference vs stated-maturity YTM |
|---|---|---|---|
| Held to 6-year maturity | -98; +9 x 5; +109 | 9.45 percent | - |
| Repaid at end of year 3 at par | -98; +9; +9; +109 | 9.80 percent | +35 bps |
| Repaid at end of year 2 at 101 | -98; +9; +110 | 10.64 percent | +119 bps |
| Crude approximation, 6 years | r + OID/n = 9.00 + 2/6 | 9.33 percent | Understates the true 6-year yield by 12 bps |
| Crude approximation, 3 years | r + OID/n = 9.00 + 2/3 | 9.67 percent | Understates the true 3-year yield by 13 bps |
Entries
Cash coupon with a base rate floor
The periodic interest rate actually payable, being the greater of the base rate and the floor, plus any credit spread adjustment, plus the credit spread. The floor is an embedded option written by the borrower to the lender on the base rate.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Formula | r = max(B, F) + CSA + S; Interest for a period = P * r * days / 360 |
| Worked | B = 0.30 percent, F = 1.00 percent, CSA = 0.10 percent, S = 5.00 percent: r = 1.00 + 0.10 + 5.00 = 6.10 percent. The floor contributed max(1.00 - 0.30, 0) = 70 bps. |
| Floor out of the money | B = 4.00 percent, same terms: r = 4.00 + 0.10 + 5.00 = 9.10 percent and the floor contributes nothing |
| Day count | ACT/360 on a 365-day year multiplies the quoted rate by 365/360. A 9.00 percent ACT/360 coupon is a 9.125 percent effective annual rate before compounding. |
- The floor is a written put on the base rate, and it is worth the most exactly when a levered lender is under the most pressure from falling rates on its own asset yield. It is the one term in the pricing stack whose value is negatively correlated with the loan's credit risk, which makes it a genuine hedge rather than just extra spread.
- A floor that is in the money means the borrower is paying above the floating rate, so a rate cut delivers no relief until the base rate clears the floor. Borrowers frequently model rate cuts as immediate interest savings and are wrong by the distance to the floor.
- Comparing two loans requires resolving the base rate convention first. A Term SOFR spread and a Daily Simple SOFR spread are not comparable at the same number, and neither is comparable to a legacy LIBOR spread without the CSA.
Source: ARRC (Alternative Reference Rates Committee) conventions for SOFR-based syndicated loans.
Original issue discount (OID)
The difference between par and the price at which the loan is funded, quoted in points where one point is one percent of par. The lender advances less than the amount it is owed, and the discount accretes to par over the life of the loan, raising the realised yield above the coupon.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Formula | Price = 100 - OID. Exact yield solves 0 = -Price + sum over t of (P*r)/(1+Y)^t + P/(1+Y)^n. Crude approximation: Y ~ r + OID/n, which understates. |
| Worked, exact | 2 points of OID, r = 9.00 percent, 6-year bullet: IRR on (-98, +9, +9, +9, +9, +9, +109) = 9.45 percent |
| Worked, crude | 9.00 + 2/6 = 9.33 percent - understates the exact figure by 12 bps because the discount is recovered at maturity rather than ratably |
| Same OID, shorter life | Repaid at end of year 3: IRR on (-98, +9, +9, +109) = 9.80 percent. Two points of OID is worth 35 bps a year over 6 years and 80 bps a year over 3. |
- OID is the pricing lever of choice when a spread is being held constant for optical or comparability reasons. Moving two points of OID is roughly equivalent to 35 bps of spread on a six-year assumption and roughly 80 bps on a three-year one - so quoting OID rather than spread lets the same economics be described as a tighter loan.
- Because OID accretes over the actual life rather than the stated maturity, its contribution to yield is inversely proportional to how long the loan stays outstanding. A discount is a bet on early repayment, and call protection is the complementary bet.
- The crude approximation r + OID/n is used almost universally and is always low, because it credits the discount ratably while the cash is only recovered at repayment. The error grows with the discount and shrinks with the tenor.
- OID has a separate tax meaning under the Internal Revenue Code with its own de minimis rule and accrual method; the tax accretion schedule is not the same as the yield arithmetic above and should not be substituted for it.
Source: Internal Revenue Code sections 1271-1275 govern the tax treatment of OID, which differs from the yield computation.
All-in yield and all-in spread
The lender's expected return expressed as a single annualised figure, combining coupon, accreted discount, and retained fees over the assumed holding period. All-in spread is the same figure stated as a margin over the base rate, so that credit compensation can be compared across rate environments.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Formula | All-in yield Y solves 0 = -(Price - retained fees) + sum of coupons discounted at Y + redemption value discounted at Y. All-in spread = Y - B_assumed. |
| Worked | Price 98, 1 point of retained upfront fee so net outlay 97, r = 9.00 percent, 3-year take-out at par: IRR on (-97, +9, +9, +109) = 10.21 percent. All-in spread over a 4.00 percent base = 621 bps. |
| Without the retained fee | IRR on (-98, +9, +9, +109) = 9.80 percent, an all-in spread of 580 bps. One point of retained fee is worth 41 bps on a 3-year assumption. |
- All-in spread is only comparable between loans if the holding period assumption is the same. A lender quoting all-in spread on a three-year take-out and one quoting on stated maturity are describing different things with the same words, and the gap is the whole of the OID and fee contribution.
- Fees paid away to an arranger or a co-lender do not enter the holding lender's yield, so a borrower's all-in cost and a lender's all-in yield diverge by exactly the fee leakage. In a club deal these can differ by more than a point.
- Base rate assumption matters for the spread figure but not for the yield figure. When rates are expected to fall, an all-in spread computed off spot base rate flatters the loan; computed off a forward curve it does not.
Yield to maturity versus yield to expected take-out
Yield to maturity assumes the loan runs to its stated maturity date. Yield to take-out assumes repayment on the date a refinancing, sale, or recapitalisation is expected. Because most sponsor-backed loans are repaid on a transaction rather than at maturity, the take-out yield is the one that describes the position.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Formula | Y_takeout solves 0 = -Price + sum for t = 1..m of (P*r)/(1+Y)^t + (P * (1 + call premium_m))/(1+Y)^m, where m is the assumed take-out year |
| Worked, 6-year YTM | (-98, +9, +9, +9, +9, +9, +109) = 9.45 percent |
| Worked, 3-year take-out at par | (-98, +9, +9, +109) = 9.80 percent, +35 bps |
| Worked, 2-year take-out at 101 | (-98, +9, +110) = 10.64 percent, +119 bps |
| Direction | Shortening the take-out raises the yield whenever the loan is priced below par or carries a call premium, and lowers it whenever it is priced above par |
- The take-out year is an assumption, not a fact, and it is the single largest free parameter in a private credit return model. A yield quoted without stating it is not a number that can be checked.
- The relationship inverts for a loan bought above par in the secondary market: there, early repayment destroys yield, and call protection becomes the lender's protection against its own upside being taken away.
- A three-year take-out assumption combined with hard call protection through year two is not conservative - it is the assumption under which the premium is collected. Modelling a take-out immediately after the call protection expires is the aggressive case, not the base case.
Call protection, soft call, and make-whole
Contractual compensation payable on early repayment. Hard call protection is a stated premium over par for a defined period. Soft call is a smaller premium payable only on a repricing or refinancing, not on repayment from other sources. A make-whole is the present value of the interest the lender would have received to a date, and is the strongest form.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Formula | Proceeds on prepayment in year m = P * (1 + premium_m); yield to that date solves 0 = -Price + sum for t = 1..m of P*r/(1+Y)^t + P*(1 + premium_m)/(1+Y)^m |
| Typical structural forms | NC-1 then 101 then par; or 102 / 101 / par; or make-whole to year 2 then 101; the shape is negotiated, not standard |
| Soft call trigger | Repricing or refinancing that reduces the effective yield on the loan, usually with a 6 to 12 month sunset and a carve-out for a change of control or a transformative acquisition |
| Make-whole formula | Premium = max(0, PV at a discount rate of remaining scheduled interest and principal to the make-whole date, less the principal repaid) |
| Worked, premium in yield terms | Repayment at end of year 2 at 101 on a loan bought at 98: IRR = 10.64 percent. At par instead of 101: IRR on (-98, +9, +109) = 10.15 percent. The one point of call premium is worth 48 bps. |
- Call protection and OID are the same trade seen from two sides. OID pays the lender for early repayment; call protection pays the lender for being repaid early. A loan with deep OID and no call protection is a loan whose lender wants to be refinanced.
- The carve-outs decide whether the protection is real. A soft call that does not apply on a change of control is no protection in a sponsor-backed credit, because the change of control is the most likely repayment event.
- A make-whole discounted at the base rate rather than at the loan's own yield produces a far larger premium, since it does not credit the lender's credit spread as a reinvestment opportunity. The discount rate in the definition is worth more than the number of years of protection.
Ticking fee
A fee accruing on a committed but unfunded amount from a specified date - typically a set number of days after signing - until funding or termination, compensating the lender for holding capital against a commitment that has not yet drawn.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Formula | Ticking fee = rate * Commitment * days / 360, accruing from the start date; often stepping up in tranches over time |
| Worked | 50 bps on a 100,000,000 commitment for the 90 days from day 31 to day 120: 100,000,000 * 0.0050 * 90/360 = 125,000 |
| Stepped structure | 50 bps for days 31-90, then 100 bps thereafter: 100,000,000 * (0.0050 * 60/360 + 0.0100 * 30/360) = 83,333 + 83,333 = 166,667 |
- The ticking fee is the borrower's clock on its own regulatory approvals. In an acquisition financing it prices the risk that the deal takes longer than the sponsor said it would, which is why the free period and the step-up dates are negotiated against the antitrust timetable rather than against the loan.
- A ticking fee accrues whether or not the acquisition closes, so it is a real cost of an uncertain deal, and it is usually the sponsor's cost rather than the target's.
- Ticking fees are quoted on the commitment, not the funded amount, so a facility that funds partially still ticks on the whole. Where a delayed-draw tranche exists, check whether the ticking fee and the unused fee both apply - in some documents they do.
Unused commitment fee
A recurring fee on the undrawn portion of a revolving or delayed-draw commitment, being the price of the borrower's option to draw. Distinct from a ticking fee, which runs to first funding rather than for the life of the facility.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Formula | Unused fee = rate * (Commitment - Drawn - LC exposure) * days / 360 |
| Worked | 37.5 bps on a 100,000,000 revolver with 50,000,000 drawn: 50,000,000 * 0.00375 = 187,500 per annum on the undrawn half |
| Effective cost of the drawn amount | If the borrower draws 50 at a 5.00 percent margin and pays 187,500 on the undrawn 50, the effective margin on drawn funds is 5.00 + (187,500/50,000,000) = 5.375 percent |
- Restating the unused fee as an increment to the drawn margin is the only way to compare a large lightly-drawn revolver with a small heavily-drawn one, and it is the calculation borrowers most often skip when sizing a facility.
- An oversized revolver is not free optionality. The unused fee is paid every year regardless, and the facility consumes debt-incurrence capacity in the covenant on its full committed amount in most definitions.
- In a delayed-draw term loan the unused fee is frequently set at a level close to the full margin, precisely so the borrower does not treat the commitment as a costless option. Check whether it steps up to the full margin at a date.
Upfront, arrangement, and structuring fees
Points on the commitment paid at closing. An arrangement or structuring fee compensates the party that originated and structured the deal; an upfront or participation fee is paid to lenders for taking the paper. Only the portion a lender retains contributes to that lender's yield.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Formula | Lender net outlay = P * (1 - OID/100) - Retained fees; yield is computed on the net outlay |
| Worked | 1 point retained on par 100 issued at 98 gives a net outlay of 97. On a 3-year take-out at par with a 9.00 percent coupon: IRR on (-97, +9, +9, +109) = 10.21 percent versus 9.80 percent without it, a 41 bps uplift. |
| Borrower view | The borrower pays 2 points of OID plus 1 point of fee, so receives 97 of the 100 it owes, an effective 3 points of issue cost regardless of who keeps the fee |
- Fee economics are where an originating lender's return diverges most from a participating lender's on identical paper. Two funds reporting the same loan at the same spread can have yields a point apart, and the difference is origination, not credit selection.
- A structuring fee retained by the manager rather than credited to the fund is an economic term worth checking in the LPA, because it is fee income earned on the fund's balance sheet risk.
- Amortising a closing fee into yield over the assumed life, rather than recognising it at close, is what makes a manager's stated portfolio yield comparable to a coupon. Recognised upfront it inflates first-year returns and depresses later ones on the same asset.
PIK versus cash-pay in a yield calculation
A PIK coupon produces the same nominal rate as a cash coupon but no interim cash, so all of the return is concentrated in the terminal payment. At the same stated rate the IRR is identical only if the PIK is paid in full at maturity; any recovery shortfall hits a PIK position harder because more of its return is at risk on the final date.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Formula | Cash-pay: cash flows are (-Price, P*r, ..., P*r + P). PIK: cash flows are (-Price, 0, ..., 0, P*(1+r)^n). Both have the same IRR at full recovery. |
| Worked, full recovery | 100 at 12.00 percent for 3 years. Cash-pay: (-100, +12, +12, +112), IRR 12.00 percent. PIK: (-100, 0, 0, +140.49), IRR = 140.49^(1/3) / 100^(1/3) - 1 = 12.00 percent. Identical. |
| Worked, 80 percent recovery at maturity | Cash-pay: (-100, +12, +12, +89.60), IRR = 4.89 percent. PIK: (-100, 0, 0, +112.39), IRR = 3.97 percent. The same 20 percent haircut costs the PIK holder 92 bps more, and the cash-pay holder has already banked 24 of cash that cannot be clawed back. |
| Duration | PIK has the longer effective duration at the same stated maturity, because no principal-equivalent cash is returned before the end |
- PIK and cash-pay are equivalent in the base case and divergent in every downside, which is exactly the shape of a position that looks well-priced on a yield screen and is not. The compensation for PIK should be a premium to the cash rate, and the size of that premium should be a function of the recovery distribution, not convention.
- Cash interest received is unrecoverable by the estate in most circumstances once the preference period has passed. Accrued PIK is simply a larger claim against the same value. That is the real distinction, and it is a legal one rather than a mathematical one.
- A portfolio's PIK share is the most informative single disclosure a private credit vehicle publishes, because PIK is where a stressed borrower's problems go before they reach a default statistic.
MFN protection on incremental debt
A most-favoured-nation clause requiring the existing loan's margin to be increased if the borrower later incurs incremental pari passu term debt at a higher effective yield, so the existing lender is not left holding cheaper paper alongside identical-ranking, better-priced debt.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Formula | Required adjustment = max(0, Yield_new - Yield_existing - Threshold), applied to the existing margin |
| Worked | Existing all-in yield 9.00 percent, MFN threshold 50 bps. New incremental at 9.75 percent: adjustment = 9.75 - 9.00 - 0.50 = 0.25, so the existing margin rises 25 bps. New incremental at 9.40 percent: adjustment = max(0, -0.10) = 0, no change. |
| Yield definition | Whether OID and upfront fees count, and at what amortisation period, determines whether the MFN can be avoided; a 4-year OID amortisation convention converts 2 points into 50 bps |
- The MFN is defeated by its definitions, not by its threshold. Carve-outs for maturity, sunset periods, tranche size, currency, and 'incurred in connection with a permitted acquisition' can leave a clause that never triggers.
- An MFN sunset is the term that matters: protection that expires after a period covers the lender exactly for the period in which the borrower was least likely to raise incremental debt anyway.
- Because the calculation compares effective yields, a borrower can price incremental debt with a wider spread and no OID and still stay inside the threshold, or vice versa. The OID amortisation convention written into the definition is therefore a pricing term.
Source: LSTA model credit agreement provisions address MFN mechanics and the components of effective yield.
Amendment and consent fees
A fee paid to consenting lenders for agreeing to a change to the credit agreement - a covenant reset, a maturity extension, a waiver, or a permitted transaction. Paid to the consenting class, usually pro rata to holdings.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Formula | Fee = points * holdings of consenting lenders; contribution to yield = fee / net outlay, annualised over the remaining assumed life |
| Worked | 50 bps consent fee on a 20,000,000 position = 100,000. Over a remaining 2-year assumed life on a 19,600,000 net outlay that is approximately 26 bps a year. |
- Amendment fee income arrives precisely when the credit is deteriorating, which makes it a poor addition to a reported yield and an excellent early indicator. A portfolio whose realised yield is being supported by consent fees is a portfolio being amended.
- The fee is the price of the lender's vote, and it is paid by the borrower for something the lender may be economically compelled to grant anyway. Where the alternative to consenting is a default the lender does not want, the fee is compensation for a decision already made.
- Fees paid only to consenting lenders create an incentive to consent quickly and a structural disadvantage for holders who wait, which is one mechanism by which a majority group forms before the minority has organised.